Consider the following example. A taxpayer has an assessment issued against her by HMRC. Her argument is that the tax is not due under the relevant taxing provision, or in the alternative that she is entitled to rely upon Extra-Statutory Concession (ESC) A19 which provides that HMRC will “give up” tax due where the body has failed to make timely use of information supplied by the taxpayer.In such a case, the taxpayer will have to institute two separate proceedings. In one, she will appeal against the assessment to the First-tier Tribunal. In the second, she will institute judicial review proceedings in the Administrative Court claiming a legitimate expectation that she was entitled to rely upon ESC A19 (or that HMRC’s decision not to apply the concession was irrational). This situation is entirely unsatisfactory. The result in either of the proceedings may render the other redundant, with the effect being a waste of the time and money of all concerned. In such a case, why should the expertly constituted First-tier Tax Tribunal not have the capacity to resolve both disputes?

In an article just published in the British Tax Review, which is available on westlaw and which can be downloaded from SSRN (available here), I seek to demonstrate that the underlying restriction is unjustified. Further, there are considerable practical benefits to extending the ambit of the First-tier Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The article will propose that taxpayers should be allowed to bring public law issues before the First-tier Tribunal where there is additionally a substantive dispute. The Tribunal is the best placed forum for resolving such cases.